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Economic approaches to decision making assume that people attach values to prospective goods and act
to maximize their obtained value. Neuroeconomics strives to observe these values directly in the brain.
A widely used valuation term in formal learning and decision-making models is the reward prediction
error: the value of an outcome relative to its expected value. An influential theory (Holroyd & Coles,
2002) claims that an electrophysiological component, feedback related negativity (FRN), codes a reward
prediction error in the human brain. Such a component should be sensitive to both the prior likelihood
of reward and its magnitude on receipt. A number of studies have found the FRN to be insensitive to
reward magnitude, thus questioning the Holroyd and Coles account. However, because of marked
inconsistencies in how the FRN is measured, a meaningful synthesis of this evidence is highly
problematic. We conducted a meta-analysis of the FRN’s response to both reward magnitude and
likelihood using a novel method in which published effect sizes were disregarded in favor of direct
measurement of the published waveforms themselves, with these waveforms then averaged to produce
“great grand averages.” Under this standardized measure, the meta-analysis revealed strong effects of
magnitude and likelihood on the FRN, consistent with it encoding a reward prediction error. In addition,
it revealed strong main effects of reward magnitude and likelihood across much of the waveform,
indicating sensitivity to unsigned prediction errors or “salience.” The great grand average technique is
proposed as a general method for meta-analysis of event-related potential (ERP).
Keywords: feedback related negativity (FRN), event-related potential (ERP), reward prediction error
(RPE), meta-analysis, great grand average
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Explaining human behavior under choice requires understanding
how humans assign value to goods and actions. This valuation occurs
at a nexus of psychological influences running from high level pro-
cesses such as framing effects and counterfactual comparisons down
to basic physiological influences such as satiation. It is likely to be
dependent on an individual’s knowledge both through conscious
extrapolation from experience and simple reinforcement learning.
Early attempts to explain human valuation were aimed at
demonstrating that choice was entirely rational, and embodied
key axioms of neoclassical economics such as expected utility.
This approach employed a black box methodology, observing
the “revealed preferences” of outward behavior in favor of the
underlying apparatus of valuation, and treating humans only “as
if” they computed utilities (Friedman, 1953; Samuelson, 1937).
These assumptions have come under attack from the field of
behavioral economics, which has succeeded in documenting
widespread and consistent deviations from rational choice. A
fully psychological approach, behavioral economics has en-
deavored to open the black box and consider a more varied set
of internal representations than the simple axioms of neoclas-
sical economics. This requires extra discriminatory power.
However, behavioral economics still largely relies on observing
behavior under real or hypothetical choice. There is thus a
possibility that the limits of this methodology may ultimately be
reached, leaving “too many theories chasing too few data”
(Glimcher, Camerer, Fehr, & Poldrack, 2009).
For this reason, the emerging field of neuroeconomics uses the
methodologies of neuroscience to test economic theories of human
behavior. Because neuroscience can perhaps be characterized as a
case of too much data backed up by too little theory, a mutually
beneficial relationship might be forged, in which economic theories of
human behavior are tested and supported to the degree to which the
neural correlates of their terms can be found. This might in turn allow
the replacement of the “as if” utilities of neoclassical economics with
fully neural descriptions. Paul Glimcher, one of the driving forces
behind neuroeconomics has, for example, conjectured that soon
enough evidence will have accumulated that we will be able to define
subjective value in fully material terms: as action potentials per
second, relative to a reference dependent anchoring point given by the
baseline firing rate in specific (though as yet unspecified) populations
of neurons (Glimcher, 2009).
This article was published Online First December 15, 2014.
Thomas D. Sambrook and Jeremy Goslin, School of Psychology, Cog-
nition Institute, University of Plymouth.
The authors would like to extend their sincere thanks to all researchers
who kindly made available their data, thus greatly strengthening the anal-
ysis performed in this article.
Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Thomas
D. Sambrook, School of Psychology, Cognition Institute, University of
Plymouth, Drake Circus, Plymouth, Devon, PL4 8AA, U.K. E-mail:
tom.sambrook@plymouth.ac.uk
Th
is
do
cu
m
en
ti
s
co
py
rig
ht
ed
by
th
e
A
m
er
ic
an
Ps
yc
ho
lo
gi
ca
lA
ss
oc
ia
tio
n
o
r
o
n
e
o
fi
ts
al
lie
d
pu
bl
ish
er
s.
Th
is
ar
tic
le
is
in
te
nd
ed
so
le
ly
fo
rt
he
pe
rs
on
al
u
se
o
ft
he
in
di
vi
du
al
u
se
r
an
d
is
n
o
t
to
be
di
ss
em
in
at
ed
br
oa
dl
y.
Psychological Bulletin © 2014 American Psychological Association
2015, Vol. 141, No. 1, 213–235 0033-2909/15/$12.00 http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/bul0000006
213
This is a bold stance. To what degree does the current evidence
suggest Glimcher’s claim, or one like it, might be realized? An
undoubted success story in this regard is the literature on single
cell activity. This suggests that single cells can indeed code a
utility signal which is independent of the stimuli that signal it, and
which varies with changes in either of the two determinants of
utility: reward magnitude and reward likelihood. Populations of
such cells have been shown both for reward prospects (Platt &
Glimcher, 1999), and their receipt (Schultz, 2010).
However, such effects need to be demonstrated in larger neural
structures if they are to be credible determinants of actual choice
behavior, and be accessible by noninvasive techniques suitable for
human subjects. Functional MRI (fMRI) has been the dominant
methodology here, with over 200 articles on reward valuation
published in the last decade, including a number explicitly inves-
tigating the terms that underlie behavioral economics’ preeminent
theory: prospect theory (Tversky & Kahneman, 1992). These
studies have shown that activation of certain key areas, particularly
the striatum and ventromedial prefrontal cortex, is correlated with
the value of anticipated or received rewards. However, individual
experiments show wide variations in activated structures, with four
recent meta-analyses of the literature (Bartra, McGuire, & Kable,
2013; Diekhof, Kaps, Falkai, & Gruber, 2012; Garrison, Erdeniz,
& Done, 2013; Liu, Hairston, Schrier, & Fan, 2011) showing
striking disparities in the broad topography of reward processing.
fMRI is limited by its poor temporal resolution, particularly with
regard to the valuation of outcomes, which, unlike the decisions
that precede them, are strongly temporally delimited. For this
reason, the event-related potential (ERP) technique, which shows
excellent temporal resolution, has a role to play in the investigation
of valuation in the human brain.
The purpose of the present article is to assess the evidence that
an ERP component known as feedback related negativity performs
a neuroeconomic valuation. Although this component has been
intensively studied, inconsistencies in its reported behavior have
obscured its true nature. It is possible, however, that these incon-
sistencies actually arise from the diverse ways in which the com-
ponent is quantified. We develop a novel technique, “great grand
averaging,” that allows a common quantification of the component
to be made, post hoc, to experiments in the existing literature.
These are then subjected to meta-analysis.
Feedback-Related Negativity
ERP studies have revealed an electrophysiological component
known as feedback-related negativity (FRN) that has been claimed
to represent valuation of an outcome. Specifically, it has been
claimed by Holroyd and Coles (2002) that this component repre-
sents a reward prediction error (RPE), that is, a signed value
corresponding to the difference between the amount of reward
obtained and the prior expected value of the reward. Expected
value refers not to the value of the most likely outcome, but rather
to a weighted average of all possible outcomes multiplied by their
respective likelihoods, and in this respect is an “average outcome.”
Positive RPEs are produced by outcomes better than expected
value, negative RPEs by those worse.
Much of neuroeconomics (and nearly the entirety of behavioral
economics) is concerned with the valuation of prospects before
their receipt, because this is what is presumed to drive choice.
RPEs can be used to investigate this question by holding outcomes
constant but varying prospects, with the valuation of a prospect
then inferred from the RPE. Furthermore, as RPEs are central to
theories of reinforcement learning, they can be used to predict
future choice. A positive RPE reinforces the propensity to make
the choice that brought it about, a negative RPE promotes the
switch to an alternative. The degree of behavioral adjustment
should be proportional to the size of the RPE, thus both the RPE’s
sign and its size are important. Formal models of reinforcement
learning (e.g., Sutton & Barto, 1998) use such quantitative RPEs
ubiquitously, and have demonstrated power in solving complex
problems (producing world class backgammon play, for example),
and model learning behavior very effectively.
The FRN is a scalp-recorded electrical potential, strongest at the
frontocentral midline, which occurs 200 ms–350 ms after feedback
on whether a reward or nonreward is obtained. At minimum, it has
been shown to be a very reliable indicator of the valence of an
outcome. That is, it can categorically distinguish between positive
RPEs and negative RPEs, showing a relatively negative voltage for
the latter. However, while this behavior is consistent with an RPE
encoding function, Holroyd and Coles’ theory requires it to show
two further properties beyond this categorical distinction. First, the
FRN must be sensitive to how much better or worse than expected
value an outcome is, that is, the FRN must vary in proportion to the
size of the RPE. Moreover, because increases in the size of
positive RPEs amount to an improved outcome, but increases in
the size of negative RPEs amount to a poorer outcome, if the FRN
encodes RPEs on a common scale of reward it should show a
Valence  RPE Size interaction. If it is responsive simply to the
main effect of RPE size this suggests an encoding of absolute, or
unsigned RPE size, that is, a response to salience. Second, the
component should be sensitive to RPE size regardless of how this
is determined. It should therefore be modulated by both of the two
determinants of RPE size: reward magnitude and reward likeli-
hood.
A large number of studies have tested for these effects, as either
a primary or secondary objective. Although their methods vary
greatly, broadly, a typical FRN task involves a series of indepen-
dent trials in which participants are offered a choice of icons to
select on a screen, and on each occasion make a selection that they
believe will maximize their reward for that trial. After a short
delay, feedback is provided on that choice, depicting whether a
reward has been obtained or not, or the size of the particular
reward. ERPs are time locked to the onset of feedback for each
trial and averaged with other trials of that condition for each
participant. These individual subject averages are used as data
points for statistical tests, and are themselves included in a grand
average ERP presented in the published article. Where the FRN’s
further modulation by RPE size is studied, this variable is most
often manipulated as a simple categorical variable of large versus
small RPEs. This variable is then crossed with the valence vari-
able. The size of the RPE is varied using either outcome magnitude
or outcome likelihood, or occasionally both. Typically, likelihood
experiments offer a fixed magnitude reward which is either ob-
tained (positive RPE) or missed (negative RPE) and manipulate
RPE size by varying expected value, either by varying the likeli-
hood of reward across blocks, or providing a cue on each trial
signaling the likelihood of reward. In contrast, magnitude experi-
ments typically hold expected value constant, often at a value of
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214 SAMBROOK AND GOSLIN
zero, give feedback indicating either a gain (positive RPE) or a loss
(negative RPE), and vary the magnitude of the outcome.
Note that the “negativity” denoted by the FRN component
merely refers to the voltage of the waveform produced by negative
RPEs relative to that produced by positive RPEs, and should not be
taken to imply that negative RPEs have a privileged role in
generating this voltage difference. This touches on an important
methodological point, that ERP waveforms on their own can be
difficult to interpret since their peaks and troughs are the sum of
many individual components, some experimental, some incidental.
For this reason, some electrophysiological components are de-
scribed not by measuring deflections on the waveforms of indi-
vidual conditions, but by those arising on the difference wave of
two waveforms corresponding to the two levels of an experimental
variable. In the case of the FRN, this variable is valence, with the
component made apparent in a difference wave created by sub-
tracting the positive RPE waveform from the negative RPE wave-
form. The simulated data in Figure 1 demonstrates this differenc-
ing process, and in doing so also depicts the predictions of Holroyd
and Coles’ theory.
Figure 1 raises an important issue of nomenclature, as the FRN
is typically operationalized as the difference between good (posi-
tive RPE) and bad (negative RPE) outcomes, that is, a valence
main effect. However, Holroyd and Coles claimed the FRN en-
coded a quantitative RPE, incorporating RPE size as well as
valence, entailing a Valence  RPE Size interaction. To keep the
distinction clear, we follow precedent in the present paper by using
the term FRN to refer to a component responsive to the main effect
of valence. We use the term RPE-FRN to refer to a component
responsive to the interaction of valence and RPE size, the hypoth-
esis under test in this meta-analysis. The simplest demonstration in
support of Holroyd and Coles would be a single component
showing both such effects in the same interval. However, it is also
possible that the effects will be asynchronous, suggesting a quan-
titative RPE encoder of the kind envisaged by Holroyd and Coles
accompanied by other components merely coding the sign of an
RPE but not its size. In the simulated data of Figure 1, for example,
the RPE-FRN in Pane e occupies a briefer interval than the FRNs
in Panes c and d. This important distinction between FRN and
RPE-FRN notwithstanding, at many points in the forthcoming
discussion a point refers equally to both terms. Except in cases
where we wish to make a point specific to the Valence RPE Size
interaction we refer simply to “the FRN.”
Existing Evidence for Modulation of the FRN by
Magnitude and Likelihood
In their original article, Holroyd and Coles (2002) confirmed
that the FRN could be modulated by reward likelihood. Although
their claim that the FRN constituted an RPE has proven highly
influential, at the time of its publication the supporting evidence
was limited to this single experiment, with no examination of
potential magnitude effects. Now, after more than a decade of
research on the FRN, we are in a much better position to assess
whether Holroyd and Coles’ account is supported by the evidence.
Although it is not an exhaustive review, because it only includes
experiments that meet our criteria for the forthcoming meta-
analysis, the picture from Appendix 1 would appear to suggest that
reward magnitude does not modulate the FRN in the predicted
manner. For those studies manipulating magnitude, six experi-
ments showed the expected effect, eight studies reported no effect
and three showed the opposite effect (i.e., the FRN was greater for
low magnitude outcomes). For those manipulating likelihood, the
evidence is stronger, if still not entirely consistent, with 13 studies
showing the predicted effect and six reporting no effect.
A similar review by Walsh and Anderson (2012) mirrors this
picture. Concerning the likelihood modulator, a simple sign test
applied to 25 studies showed a significant effect consistent with an
RPE coding. In comparison, magnitude could not be shown to
significantly modulate the FRN. The authors argued the absence of
magnitude effects could be because the majority of experiments
cued participants as to whether an outcome would be high or low
magnitude at the beginning of each trial. Thus, magnitude effects
in these experiments could have been lost to scaling effects. The
two studies in Walsh and Anderson’s review that were uncued
showed at least partial support for an FRN modulated by magni-
tude, and on this basis the authors argued support for the Holroyd
and Coles theory. However, this very limited sample must be
acknowledged to leave any meta-analytical basis for the magnitude
modulator unproven.
Problems With FRN Measurement and Implications
for Meta-Analysis
The ERP technique’s poor spatial resolution means that any
individual experiment using ERPs is vulnerable to spurious con-
clusions arising from overlap of the component under consider-
ation (here, the FRN) with other components occurring in the same
temporal interval. The difference wave methodology by which the
FRN is best studied will not remove interfering components which
also code valence, nor can it remove all the effects of components
that are even partially affected by valence. In gathering the data for
this meta-analysis, examination of individual studies’ waveforms
showed a remarkable variability in their character, assumed to
arise from differences in task, procedure and stimuli. This suggests
that the FRN suffers from serious overlap with unknown compo-
nents which might, quite incidentally, be responsive to any of the
three factors (valence, magnitude, likelihood) under study. Be-
cause the sources of the component overlap are unknown in each
case, a broad meta-analysis is therefore more robust than any
single experiment.
A serious hindrance to meta-analysis, however, is the lack of
consistency in how the FRN is quantified. In some articles it is
measured by the voltage of a single peak, in others the difference between
two peaks, in others the difference of one peak and the average of
surrounding peaks, and in others by the mean amplitude in a set
interval. Analysis is sometimes conducted on difference waves and
sometimes on the original simple waveforms. Perhaps most seri-
ously, the temporal interval in which the FRN is measured varies
widely. Appendix 1 shows the quantification of the FRN in each of
the studies used in this meta-analysis. It was found that both mean
amplitude measures and peak assignment are made in intervals
ranging from 50 ms to 150 ms duration, at substantially different
latencies, with some studies using intervals that do not even
overlap. The 200- to 350-ms interval after feedback, where the
bulk of the FRN measures lie, is characterized by a steep, alter-
nating, positive-negative-positive going waveform, and so differ-
ences in the interval in which the FRN is measured can have large
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215FRN GREAT GRAND AVERAGES
Figure 1. How the FRN is studied. Panes a and b show grand average waveforms for four experimental conditions taken
from a 2  2 design manipulating valence (positive RPEs vs. negative RPEs) and RPE size (large vs. small). A given
experiment would manipulate RPE size using either outcome magnitude or likelihood. The simple waveforms in Panes a
and b show complex peaks which are the result of consecutive, overlapping components, many of which are unknown.
Difference waves (FRNs), constructed by subtracting the positive RPE outcome waveform from the negative RPE outcome
waveform are shown in Panes c and d. These control for components unrelated to valence, allowing the valence effect to
be more clearly seen. Comparison of Panes c and d also suggests that the amplitude of the FRN in these data is sensitive
to RPE size. This is definitively shown by differencing the difference waves in Pane e. Collectively, the figures represent
the prediction of Holroyd and Coles’ theory, with Pane a corresponding to low magnitude or likely outcomes and pane b
to high magnitude, or unlikely outcomes. See the online article for the color version of this figure.
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216 SAMBROOK AND GOSLIN
ramifications, with waveforms from different experiments that
look similar on the page producing opposing conclusions once
they are quantified and subjected to a statistical test. This may lead
to failures of replication. Conversely, it also possible that unex-
pected effects may go unnoticed as a result of the interval used,
leading to successful but unwarranted replication, and an inflating
of the apparent robustness of the FRN component and effects
associated with it. The consequence for meta-analysis is that the
compilation of the statistical results of FRN studies would be far
more sensitive to idiosyncrasies in how the FRN is quantified than
is desirable.
A Novel Method: Great Grand Averages
The problem of miscellaneous measures described above
prompted us to use a novel means of meta-analysis. Typically, a
meta-analysis uses standardized effect sizes derived from individ-
ual research articles as replicates for some statistical test for an
effect of interest (most typically whether the effect size is signif-
icantly different from zero). A basic assumption of any statistical
test, meta-analytic or otherwise, is that all data constitute obser-
vations of the same phenomenon. In our case, this phenomenon
would consist of neural events comprising activity of the FRN
component. As previous discussed, it is not well established
whether the neural events measured across the range of previous
studies arise exclusively from the FRN. Moreover, the mixture of
mean voltage and peak to peak measures, and the wide range of
intervals used to quantify the FRN component also raise serious
concerns over the equivalence of effect sizes measured across the
literature.
Our meta-analysis avoided the miscellaneous measures problem
by ignoring the quantification of the FRN the authors of individual
articles had used. Instead, we took published grand average wave-
forms in all experiments that met our criteria, digitized these
waveforms to extract their coordinates and averaged these coordi-
nates across experiments to create composite waveforms repre-
senting “great grand average” (GGA) waveforms. Although this
approach is borne of necessity, there are nevertheless some bene-
fits to bypassing the quantification provided by the original authors
and going “upstream” to the published waveforms. One advantage
is that a great deal of information is thrown away in the conversion
of waveforms to unitary scores of component amplitude, and the
GGA technique retains that information up to the point of quan-
tifying the final GGA waveform. This means that effects that are
small or lie outside typically analyzed intervals, but which are
consistently present, can become noticeable.
A second advantage is the method’s potential to reduce the
effects of component overlap. In a single ERP experiment, aver-
aging across trials reduces the effect of incidental neural activity
that is peculiar to a given trial, thereby accentuating task-related
components, which are elicited on every trial. However, this does
not help reduce components that happen to be elicited by the task,
but are not the subject of the experiment. This causes component
overlap, and complicates the measurement of the component under
study. Under the GGA technique, some of this component overlap
is reduced due to the variations in the tasks used in different
experiments. Averaging across experiments reduces the effect of
incidental components which are peculiar to a given task, thereby
accentuating the component under study, which will be elicited in
all tasks. Of course, components other than the one under study
which happen to be elicited by the factors of an experiment (here
valence, magnitude, and likelihood) will not be reduced by the
GGA technique.
A third advantage arises from differences in the latency at which
the FRN occurs in the pool of experiments used to create the GGA
waveforms. This produces “smearing” of the peaks that character-
ize the feedback-locked ERP, reducing their amplitude, and wid-
ening the duration of general positive and negative deflections. For
the purposes of the study at hand, we regard such smearing as a
methodological strength. This is because it reduces the availability
of bespoke intervals in which strong, but likely unreplicable effects
can be found. This ensures a fairer test of the RPE account. Thus
what is lost in (possibly misleading) peak amplitude is gained in
reliability. It must be noted that the advantages of this meta-
analysis technique are not specific to the study of the FRN, rather,
they are highly generic and could be applied to the meta-analysis
of any ERP component.
The disadvantages of the method are that the extraction of the
data directly from the waveforms introduces a new source of
measurement error, and that disregarding the reported statistics
eliminates the only source of information concerning the within-
study variance of the studies entering the meta-analysis. These
issues are considered empirically later.
Moderators
While the variability of the waveforms produced by FRN ex-
periments has complicated their interpretation and presented meth-
odological challenges, it is possible that some of this variation is
systematically related to differences in experimental tasks, and can
thus be used to infer properties of the component. We therefore
performed the following moderator analyses.
RPE Modulator
Modulator refers to whether outcome magnitude or outcome
likelihood was used to manipulate the size of RPEs. While dem-
onstrating that the FRN is a generalized RPE encoder requires that
it be responsive to both modulators, and so their effects needed to
be established independently, a comparison of those effects is
potentially illuminating because evidence that the FRN is a gen-
eralized RPE encoder would be bolstered by a relative insensitivity
to the source of the RPE size modulation.
Control Over Outcome
The expected value against which an RPE is generated might
consist either in the expected value of the preceding stimulus, or in
the expected value of the action performed in response to that
stimulus (Balleine, Daw, & O’Doherty, 2008). That is to say the
RPE might contribute to either Pavlovian or instrumental condi-
tioning. This matter may be addressed by examining the degree to
which control over outcome affects FRN amplitude. An RPE used
in Pavlovian conditioning, perhaps reflecting a general role in
valuation, will occur even when participants passively observe
outcomes. In contrast if the FRN is greatest following a meaning-
ful action on the part of the participant this suggests a role in
instrumental conditioning.
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Magnitude Cueing
Although reward likelihood is fundamentally limited to values
between zero and one, there is no such delimitation to reward
magnitude. In order to be able to show satisfactory discrimination
across a wide range of outcome magnitudes it would appear
necessary that the FRN scale its response relative to the range of
magnitudes considered available in the immediate context. Such
scaling has been shown by Tobler, Fiorillo, and Schultz (2005) in
macaque midbrain neurons, which produced equivalent responses
to rewards of different magnitudes when the range of magnitude
available on that trial was signaled to the subject beforehand.
Bunzeck, Dayan, Dolan, and Duzel (2010) found a similar scaling
effect in a study of humans using fMRI. Schultz (2009) has
suggested that scaling is performed not on the absolute range of
outcomes possible in a given context but on their estimated dis-
tribution, and that RPEs accordingly represent z scores. Although
the question of scaling is of theoretical interest, it is also method-
ologically important because scaling effects may have been re-
sponsible for the absence of FRN sensitivity to magnitude in the
literature. This moderator analysis investigated whether effects of
magnitude on the FRN were reduced in cued experiments as would
be expected if scaling occurred.
Domain
Although the FRN has a well-established sensitivity to valence,
i.e. the sign of an RPE, this is formally orthogonal to the domain
of the outcome, that is, whether the outcome constitutes an actual
monetary loss or gain. For example, losses can still be positive
RPEs if they are smaller than expected losses. A number of recent
studies have suggested that the FRN is accentuated when measured
in the gain rather than loss domain (Kreussel et al., 2012; Kujawa,
Smith, Luhmann, & Hajcak, 2013; Mushtaq, Stoet, Bland, &
Schaefer, 2013; Sambrook, Roser, & Goslin, 2012; Yu & Zhang,
2014). This suggests the possibility of a neural dissociation of how
outcomes are processed in gain and loss domains that is of broad
theoretical interest, not least because this reduced sensitivity for
outcomes in the loss domain, or “loss indifference,” is in direct
opposition to the prediction of loss aversion made by prospect
theory.
Method
Inclusion and Exclusion Criteria
The independent variables used in this meta-analysis were out-
come valence (positive RPE, negative RPE), outcome magnitude
(high, low) and outcome likelihood (likely, unlikely), where this
final variable refers to prior likelihood of an obtained outcome. For
inclusion, an experiment had to contain within it a 2  2 factorial
manipulation of valence with respect to either likelihood or mag-
nitude. Where more than two levels of the likelihood or magnitude
variable were presented in an article, intermediate ones were
ignored in order to maximize contrasts.
The dependent variable differed depending on the particular
contrast examined, as detailed in the coding procedures section
below. In all cases it was a voltage derived from the differencing
of four simple waveforms related to the factorial design described
above. Consequently, a key inclusion criterion was that a study
must present such a set of simple waveforms. Waveforms had to be
plotted for at least 500 ms postfeedback and 100 ms prior, and had
to be locked to feedback, not response. Because waveforms were
in many cases plotted at only a single electrode, and because
variability of the electrode used suggested a broad distribution for
the FRN, an experiment was included as long as it presented
waveforms at Fz, FCz, Cz or “a frontocentral pool.” Variability
was minimized by using FCz waveforms where available (even if
individual articles reported the FRN to be maximal at a different
site), and where they were not, using Fz, Cz, or frontocentral pool
in that order of preference.
Studies using populations other than healthy nonolder adults
were used only if control data for this population were available
and participants had not been selected on the basis of any pre-
screening (e.g., personality scales). The experiment had to offer
monetary rewards conveyed by feedback, although tasks could
vary widely, including guessing games, time estimation tasks, and
simply passive observation. Experiments could either employ
mixed gambles comprised of wins and losses, gain domain gam-
bles where participants either won or failed to win a stake, or loss
domain gambles where subjects lost a stake or successfully
avoided this. Losses and omitted rewards were classed as negative
RPEs, wins and avoided losses were classed as positive RPEs.
Where separate waveforms were presented for the portion of an
experiment before and after participants learned a rule that allowed
them to assess reward likelihood, waveforms for the portion after
learning were used, because these could be expected to produce the
strongest effect of likelihood on prediction errors. Experiments
which manipulated factors other than the three of interest were
included, although in some cases waveforms were used at one
level of that additional factor, often a control level, if available and
appropriate (see Appendix 1).
Experiments were excluded if the factor of magnitude, likeli-
hood, or valence was confounded with another variable. Although
experiments manipulating both magnitude and likelihood were
acceptable (and in these cases were used twice in the analysis, once
for each modulator) they were excluded if these variables con-
founded each other. This was common in Iowa Gambling Tasks
and where participants could genuinely optimize their choice.
Experiments where the FRN was a response to observation of
another’s performance were excluded. Magnitude experiments
were considered ineligible if levels of the magnitude variable were
blocked, because we expected this would strongly exacerbate
scaling effects, with the FRN responding simply to the valence of
the outcome at the given level of the stakes in that block (although
in fact no otherwise eligible experiments were excluded on this
basis). In the case of likelihood experiments, the following criteria
were employed. There had to be two levels of the likelihood
modulator either side of, and equal distance from 50% probability
to avoid confounding likelihood with uncertainty, a property the
feedback-locked ERP may be responsive to (Yu, Zhou, & Zhou,
2011). If participants received explicit instruction on probabilities
this had to be consistent with real probabilities so that there could
be no ambiguity regarding the value of expected value that RPEs
were generated with respect to. Experiments were excluded if
participants could learn to actively avoid disadvantageous trials
(e.g., by knowing which button to press to always ensure 50%
reward probability) because this made unlikely positive RPEs and
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218 SAMBROOK AND GOSLIN
likely negative RPEs infrequent, introducing a possible confound,
and also leaving participants’ motives for their suboptimal choice
unclear.
Moderator Analyses
Modulator. Coding of this moderator was straightforward. In
those cases (k  2) where both magnitude and likelihood were
manipulated, the two conditions were entered as independent stud-
ies for this analysis.
Control over outcome. Operationalizing this moderator was
inherently problematic because perception of control is highly
variable across people (Langer, 1975). We used three levels of this
moderator variable, which we believed would maximize contrasts.
Level 1, termed “passive,” covered tasks in which participants
were given no opportunity to act meaningfully prior to feedback.
At the other end of the scale, Level 3, termed “rule implementa-
tion” comprised tasks where actions could be performed and where
feedback was genuinely (and therefore ultimately visibly) depen-
dent on choice of action. Level 2 was termed “guessing.” This
level encompassed all tasks in which participants acted but could
not actually affect the outcome. This included, for example, cases
where participants had to guess the location of a prize, or choose
the stakes for a particular trial. It is true that participants might
have believed that they had a degree of control over the outcome,
but information on these beliefs was generally not available. We
assumed that where control over an outcome was neither evidently
absent (Level 1) nor present (Level 3), participants would experi-
ence, on average, some intermediate perception of control.
Domain. A direct comparison of the amplitude of the FRN in
loss and gain domains could not be made because only two studies
included any pure loss domain trials. However, many studies
offered mixed gambles, in which positive RPEs were always gains
and negative RPEs always losses, and the loss indifference effect
described earlier might be expected to attenuate effects in the loss
portion, producing a net reduction of the FRN overall in mixed
gambles. Domain was therefore coded with two levels. The first,
“gain domain” comprised all cases where the worst possible out-
come was no reward. The other level, “mixed domain,” comprised
cases where monetary losses as well as gains could be incurred.
Magnitude cuing. This analysis applied to magnitude studies
only. Cued studies comprised all cases where participants knew the
magnitude of the forthcoming feedback but not its valence, uncued
studies comprised cases where they knew neither its magnitude nor
valence. A single study in which magnitude cuing was manipu-
lated as an independent variable was entered into this analysis as
two separate studies.
Search Strategies
Published data. The first author performed the literature
search and assessed studies for suitability. A search for English
language journal articles and books was performed using the
following databases: PsychInfo, PsychBooks, PsychArticles,
ERIC, PubMed, and Web of Science. Results were compiled in
EndNote. Abstracts, titles, and keywords were searched using the
term “feedback negativity” OR “feedback related negativity” OR
“feedback error-related negativity” OR “reward positivity” OR
“feedback correct related positivity.” Duplicates, clearly inappro-
priate journals and conference abstracts were removed without
inspection, as were articles published prior to 1997 (the year of
publication of the first FRN article; Miltner, Braun, & Coles,
1997). Two-hundred and 15 papers remained, of which 42 were
deemed eligible after checking inclusion and exclusion criteria.
The FRN is sometimes referred to generically as an “error
related negativity,” even though this term is more commonly used
to refer to a waveform locked to subjects’ own responses, and
indicating internal registration of a known error, rather than a
response to external feedback. It is also sometimes referred to
generically as a mediofrontal negativity. We conducted a second-
ary search using the term “error related negativity” OR “medio-
frontal negativity” OR “medial frontal negativity.” After removing
duplicates, duplicates with the earlier search, clearly inappropriate
journals and conference proceedings, and articles predating 1997,
1,012 articles remained. The abstracts were scanned for evidence
that feedback locked waveforms were studied, producing 125
possible articles, of which four met the criteria for eligibility.
The reference lists of all eligible articles were checked, along
with those of two recent reviews of the FRN (San Martin, 2012;
Walsh & Anderson, 2012), producing one further eligible article.
In total, these search criteria resulted in the inclusion of 47 datasets
from published papers in our meta-analysis.
Unpublished data. In an effort to include unpublished data,
all first or corresponding authors of the selected articles were
contacted with a request for unpublished data. A number of other
researchers were also contacted, identified as follows. Articles
returned by the searches described above which had been rejected
were reexamined, and 154 authors added to a contact list. A search
of theses using the ProQuest Dissertations and Theses database
and the Ethos database returned 73 hits for the primary search
string and 370 for the secondary one. The contents pages of these
theses were read online and 17 authors added to the contact list.
Abstracts of 56 conference articles, extracted from the searches
described earlier, were read, and on this basis eight more authors
were added. In the course of contacting authors, a further four
suggestions were garnered. One hundred seventy-one of 183
e-mail addresses were successfully obtained by Internet search and
these researchers contacted. Responses were obtained from 51
researchers. Four entirely unpublished datasets were retrieved by
this process, and one dataset associated with a published article in
which the requisite waveforms had not been presented. Three
unpublished studies of the authors’ own were also added. There-
fore, we finally included 55 datasets into our meta-analysis, 47
from published data, eight from unpublished data.
Validation data. As this is the first implementation of the
GGA technique, we sought to validate it by comparing its findings
with those resulting from conventional meta-analysis based on
standardized effect sizes. For a meaningful comparison, it was
important that these standardized effect sizes were generated in the
same fixed interval of the waveform as that used for the GGA
analysis. Effect sizes (or their derivatives) reported in the original
articles did not correspond to this, or any fixed interval. It was their
variability that prompted development of the GGA technique. To
carry out the validation we therefore contacted authors of all the 55
articles used in our GGA analysis with a request for their original
data so that we might calculate standardized effect sizes in the
designated interval ourselves. This request returned original data
for 14 of the 29 magnitude studies and 13 of the 26 likelihood
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219FRN GREAT GRAND AVERAGES
studies. These studies are hereafter referred to as the validation
dataset.
Coding Procedures: Generating Great Grand
Averages Waveforms
Digitizing of published waveforms was performed with Plot-
Digitizer (http://sourceforge.net/projects/plotdigitizer/). Electronic
copies of experiments were accessed, and the figures containing
the requisite waveforms were enlarged and then opened in the
PlotDigitizer software. Digitizing began by using a mouse to
calibrate the minimum and maximum values of the x- and y-axis to
the distance they occupied on the screen, thus defining the coor-
dinate space of the area of the figure. The coordinates described by
the actual ERPs were extracted by using a mouse to manually lay
points along the waveforms at approximately 5 ms intervals. These
were then run through a purpose-written program (supplied as a
supplementary file) that linearly interpolated coordinates at 1 ms
intervals between the existing manually assigned ones. For every
waveform undergoing the process, this generated a series of volt-
age values at discrete 1 ms intervals that made the subsequent
process of averaging across studies tractable. The coordinates were
immediately replotted to visually check that they corresponded to
the original waveform they were taken from to prevent gross
errors. All waveforms were digitized twice in this fashion, partly to
improve accuracy and partly to allow reliability checks discussed
below.
The consequence of this digitizing process was that for each
study in the meta-analysis, we were able to recover the data that
underlay the four relevant grand average waveforms, plus some
measurement error. For the 27 experiments that were also repre-
sented in the validation dataset, original data replaced the digitized
versions for the bulk of subsequent analysis. In these 27 cases the
digitized versions were merely used to assess the degree of digi-
tizing measurement error, as described later.
Coding Procedures: Quantifying the FRN
The grand average waveforms that were recovered by the dig-
itizing process were submitted to the differencing process shown
in Figure 1 in order to establish whether an RPE-FRN was present.
As noted earlier, the RPE-FRN refers to a component responding
to the interaction of RPE size and valence. Such an interaction is
present when the difference waves shown in Panes c and d of
Figure 1 differ in amplitude. The effect size of the RPE-FRN
component was thus the amplitude of the waveform corresponding
to the difference of difference waves shown in Pane e of Figure 1,
and its significance was based on a comparison of the amplitudes
of its constituent difference waves, that is, those corresponding to
Panes c and d, with this comparison made across the sample of
either likelihood (k  26) or magnitude (k  29) studies.
Difference wave amplitude is typically measured either by
using the waveform’s peak within a set interval, or its mean
amplitude within a usually smaller interval. To provide a robust
test of whether an RPE-FRN was present, we used both mea-
sures. The interval in which the measures were taken was
determined by the average of those intervals used in the original
papers. Those studies that used a mean amplitude measure
produced an average measurement interval of 228 ms–344 ms,
and those using a peak amplitude measure produced an average
measurement interval of 128 ms– 460 ms.
In addition to exploring the effect of magnitude and likelihood
modulators on the FRN, we were interested in the effects of these
variables in their own right, that is, their main effects. To study
these, rather than differencing the valence variable, it was col-
lapsed out at each level of magnitude and likelihood, allowing the
comparison of high and low magnitude waveforms and high and
low likelihood waveforms. Thus, in the scheme shown in Figure 1,
an average waveform was created in each of Panes a and b and
these were then differenced (small RPE–large RPE) to produce an
RPE size main effect difference wave.
Statistical Methods
Simple and standardized effect sizes. The differencing pro-
cess described above was performed on each individual study,
generating an effect size for the RPE-FRN, thus allowing a test
for the significance of this effect size across the studies that
made up the dataset. This process made no use of the standard
deviation of the effect size within a given study, however, that
is, calculated across the subjects of that study, nor could it do
so, because the digitizing process only had access to grand
average waveforms. As noted, this does not prevent us testing for
the significance of the effect across studies, but does prevent the
relative weighting of individual studies based upon the variance of
their data. This is generally used to down-weight the contribution
from studies showing high variability on the basis that their esti-
mate of the effect under question can be assumed to be less
reliable. Conventional meta-analysis achieves this weighting up
front by using standardized effect sizes (often referred to simply as
“effect sizes”) as the unit of analysis, which down-weight effects
when they are underlain by high variability. The standardized
effect size metric in which this is most obviously expressed is
Cohen’s d, which is the difference between two scores of interest
divided by their pooled standard deviation. Standardized effect
sizes can be contrasted with simple effect sizes (Baguley, 2009) or
“raw mean differences” (Bond, Wiitala, & Richard, 2003) which,
as the name suggests, are equivalent to Cohen’s d without any
division by standard deviation. Simple effect sizes are what are
produced by the GGA technique and what are used in the GGA
meta-analysis presented here.
Both Baguley, 2009 and Bond, Wiitala, and Richard (2003)
have argued the virtues of working with simple effect sizes over
standardized ones, noting the ease with which they can then be
used to practically guide future studies (e.g., in the present case, a
simple effect size informs researchers of the size in microvolts that
they can expect to be working with) and observing that the stan-
dard deviations that are used to calculate Cohen’s d are themselves
subject to the sampling error they purport to correct for. Another
reason why standardized effect sizes have become the norm in
meta-analyses is that they allow the comparison of scores derived
from different scales of measurement, which is not an issue here,
where the metric is always voltage. Nevertheless, the use of simple
rather than standardized effect sizes is a notable feature of the
GGA technique and we later examine its consequences using the
validation dataset.
Testing the hypothesis I: t tests on GGAs. Our hypothesis
was that the FRN would be greater when RPEs were large rather
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220 SAMBROOK AND GOSLIN
than small, as described in Panes c and d of Figure 1. Because the
criterion for a generalized RPE encoder is that it should be mod-
ulated by both reward magnitude and likelihood, these two mod-
ulators were tested separately. In each case, a paired samples t test
was conducted of the amplitude of FRNs constructed from small
RPEs versus large RPEs. Four tests were done in total, on peak
measures and mean amplitude measures of the magnitude and
likelihood modulated FRNs. T tests were entirely analogous to
those which might be performed on individual FRN experiments
but at “one level higher” using grand average data as data points,
rather than subject average data.
Because sample size differed over studies, and conventional
meta-analysis typically incorporates this information (Field & Gil-
lett, 2010; Hunter & Schmidt, 2004), weighted t tests were used.
The t statistic was calculated with the standard formula for paired
samples
t
XD
SD
N
Where XD is the mean difference of the paired samples, and SD
its standard deviation. However, XD was a weighted mean differ-
ence, calculated from k individual study mean differences (x)
whose sample size was used as a weight (w), as follows
XD

i1
k
wixi

i1
k
wi
The standard deviation of this difference was also weighted, as
follows
SD

i1
k
wi(XiXD)

i1
k
wi
Unless otherwise stated, all statistics performed on GGAs used
weighted means and standard deviations.
Sensitivity to publication bias was assessed by inspection of
funnel plots followed by trim and fill (Duval & Tweedie, 2000)
implemented in R using the metafor package (Viechtbauer, 2010).
Testing the hypothesis II: Data driven cluster randomization
of GGAs. The analysis described above provides a fair but
straightforward test of the hypothesis because the FRN was quan-
tified in an interval determined a priori by the existing literature.
However, it remains possible that this interval is a poor choice,
certainly for capturing the RPE-FRN, that is, the response to the
interaction of RPE size and valence. We therefore used a second,
data driven technique, that examined the full length of waveforms
for evidence of an RPE-FRN component. As well as addressing the
danger of using the wrong interval, this had the secondary advan-
tage that it could extract the observed interval of the RPE-FRN
post hoc. The multiple comparisons resulting from the analysis of
the whole waveform were avoided by using the cluster random-
ization procedure of Maris and Oostenveld (2007). This procedure
allows an entire ERP waveform to be analyzed without incurring
the excess conservatism of a strict Bonferroni correction for each
time point analyzed. It achieves this by recognizing that because
voltages are strongly correlated at adjacent time points, the effec-
tive number of comparisons being made when an entire waveform
is analyzed is much lower than the number of sample points in the
waveform. First, t tests were performed on the two difference wave
amplitudes at each time point, and clusters of time points at which
the difference in the difference wave amplitudes was statistically
significant (p  .05) were marked as being of potential signifi-
cance. The values of t for each time point in these clusters were
summed to produce a cluster-level t statistic. This was then com-
pared to a probability distribution for such cluster-level t statistics
generated by 10,000 runs of a Monte Carlo simulation on null
distribution data in the interval occupied by the cluster. This was
used to assign a Monte Carlo p value to the cluster of significant
t values identified at the start of the process.
Heterogeneity of GGAs. Meta-analyses typically report het-
erogeneity, a measure of the likelihood that the sample effect sizes
in the meta-analysis are drawn from more than one population.
This is shown by a variance across sample effect sizes which
exceeds that expected from the within-study variances. Because
within-study variances are unknown under the GGA technique,
heterogeneity cannot be measured. It can, however, be implied by
demonstration of the significant effect of moderators.
Moderator analysis. This is conventionally performed in
conjunction with a standardized effect size based meta-analysis,
something we could not do with the GGAs, as we could not
compute standardized effect sizes. To test for the effects of mod-
erators, we performed univariate analyses with the moderator as a
single categorical independent variable. The dependent variable
was the simple effect size of the RPE-FRN. Unweighted effect
sizes were used in an ANCOVA analysis with weighting applied
using the weighted least squares function. To maximize the power
of the moderator analysis, likelihood and magnitude modulated
studies were analyzed together. Because validation of the GGA
technique (reported later) suggested that mean amplitude measures
produced closer estimates to an ideal conventional meta-analysis
than peak measures, only mean amplitude measures were used for
moderator analysis. Confounding of moderators was checked us-
ing contingency coefficients of all possible pairs of the four
moderators, and where significant 2 values where found, entering
the confounding moderators as covariates.
Meta-analysis of validation data. Conventional meta-
analysis was performed using standardized effect sizes of the
RPE-FRN generated from original data obtained from authors.
Differencing of waveforms and calculation of t values was per-
formed in the same way as was done for GGAs, with t values then
converted to Cohen’s d. A calculation from t values was used
rather than direct calculation using the mean difference divided by
its standard deviation because of problems arising from the stan-
dard deviation term of paired samples designs. As Dunlap, Cortina,
Vaslow, and Burke (1996) have observed, paired samples designs
increase power by reducing the standard deviation term. This
makes it easier to detect an effect (e.g., t is increased). However,
the paired samples design does not change the effect’s size, which
is what d purports to represent. Using the paired samples standard
deviation in calculating d therefore conflates effect size with effect
significance and inflates the estimate of d. Because the degree of
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221FRN GREAT GRAND AVERAGES
this inflated estimate is proportional to the additional power the
paired design provides, and this in turn is proportional to the extent
to which the paired scores move together, d can be corrected by
using the correlation coefficient of the two conditions underlying
the t test. Dunlap et al.’s formula for this unbiased calculation is
shown below and was used for calculation of d. Note that the r
term should not be confused with an effect size metric.
d t .2(1 r)
n
Meta-analysis was conducted using the method of Hunter and
Schmidt (2004), with studies weighted by their sample size rather
than inverse variance, because this allowed the closest comparison
with the GGA technique. A random effects model was used, due to
concerns over the generalizability of fixed effects models (Field &
Gillett, 2010). The meta-analysis produced an estimated effect
size, confidence intervals for this estimate, and, most importantly
for our validation purposes, a significance test that could be
compared with that produced by the GGA technique. Heterogene-
ity was measured using the Q statistic. Analyses were implemented
in the macros provided by Field and Gillett (2010) apart from trim
and fill which was implemented in R using the metafor package.
Meta-analysis of published data. Although the GGA tech-
nique is premised on the unsuitability of published FRN effect
sizes for meta-analysis, we ran a further meta-analysis using pub-
lished effects for illustrative purposes. The effect size measure
used was once again Cohen’s d. Effect sizes were frequently not
reported in the published articles, and where they were it was
typically in the form of partial eta squared. Values of d were
therefore calculated directly from reported test statistics using
conventional approximations. Where the reported statistic was t,
the Dunlap formula above was used with r estimated at 0.5: The
average correlation found in our validation dataset was in fact
0.49. Where the statistic given was an F value, that is, rather than
a difference of difference waves, the RPE-FRN effect size was
expressed as a Valence x RPE Size interaction, Rosenthal’s (1991)
conversion was used:
d 2 Fdfd
In cases where effects were reported as “nonsignificant” or an
inequality based on a canonical value such as F  1 was given, d
was set to zero. If a noncanonical value of a statistic or p value was
given (e.g., p  .06) this was taken as the actual value. Meta-
analysis was then performed as described for the validation data.
Results
Modulation of the FRN by Magnitude and Likelihood
Figure 2 shows simple great grand average waveforms for
magnitude and likelihood designs. The underlying data for the
digitized grand average waveforms are provided as supplementary
information, as are the derived difference waves that follow. These
can be interpreted and replotted using the accompanying docu-
mentation. Figure 3 depicts the central test of the hypothesis. It can
be seen from Figure 3a that the FRN for high magnitude outcomes
is of greater amplitude than the FRN for low magnitude outcomes,
suggesting that the FRN is sensitive to outcome magnitude in the
manner predicted. This sensitivity is plotted as an RPE-FRN, that
is, the difference of the high magnitude difference wave and the
low magnitude difference wave. A paired samples t test on mean
FRN amplitudes in the interval 228 ms–334 ms revealed a signif-
icant difference (Mlow1.52 v, Mhigh2.20 v, RPE-FRN
simple effect size  .68 v, t(28)  4.41, p  .001). A t test
on peak FRN amplitudes in the interval 129 ms–447 ms also
showed a significant difference (Mlow  2.30 v,
Mhigh  3.11 v, RPE-FRN simple effect size  0.81 v,
t(28)  3.11).
Similar comparisons for the likelihood modulator can be seen in
Figure 3b, where it can be seen that, as predicted, the FRN for
unlikely outcomes is of greater amplitude than the FRN for likely
outcomes, again generating an RPE-FRN. The effect was signifi-
cant under a mean amplitude measure in the interval 228 ms–334
ms (Mlikely  1.56 v, Munlikely  3.10 v, RPE-FRN simple
effect size  1.54 v, t(25)  5.44 v, p  .001) and a peak
measure in the interval 129 ms–447 ms (Mlikely  2.84 v,
Munlikely  4.65 v, RPE-FRN simple effect size  1.84 v,
t(25)  5.62 v, p  .001). The RPE-FRN simple effect sizes
for both modulators under the mean amplitude measure are shown
as a forest plot in Figure 4. As a further check, the t tests described
above were conducted on unweighted scores to ensure that the
effects were not unduly affected by a few studies with large sample
sizes. All effects remained strongly significant.
The hypothesis was thus supported using a quantification of the
FRN based on a priori intervals derived from the literature. The
Maris and Oostenveld procedure was then used to more accurately
determine the latency of the RPE-FRN specifically. For the mag-
nitude modulator, a single significant cluster of RPE-FRN activity
was found (Monte Carlo p  .0001), running from 240 ms–341
ms, with the effect greatest at 298 ms (.91 v). For the likelihood
modulator a single cluster of RPE-FRN activity was found (Monte
Carlo p  .0001), running from 209 ms to the edge of the
measurement interval at 500 ms. The effect was equally great at
274 ms and 352 ms (1.80 v) but much more significantly so at
the earlier peak: t(25)  6.46.
Figure 2. Simple waveforms for (a) magnitude experiments, and (b)
likelihood experiments. Only 100 ms of baseline is shown, explaining how
the baseline has become negative overall.
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Publication Bias
Publication bias was assessed by inspection of the funnel plots
shown in Figure 5. Because these suggested a small degree of
asymmetry, albeit largely among studies with large rather than
small sample sizes, we applied a trim and fill procedure. This was
implemented by entering the simple effect sizes derived from
GGA analyses into a conventional meta-analysis, rebalancing po-
tential asymmetry in the funnel plots by adding additional imputed
studies, and then recalculating effect sizes. In fact, this procedure
resulted in no additional studies being imputed, leaving effect sizes
unchanged, and demonstrating absence of publication bias.
Moderator Analyses of the FRN
2 tests revealed strong associations (p .001) between three of
the four moderators: modulator, domain, and control over out-
come. To test the effect of each moderator individually, while
controlling for the effects of the others, analysis of covariance was
used with the confounding moderators entered as covariates. Once
again, a mean amplitude measure in the interval 228 ms–334 ms
was used.
Modulator. No significant effect of modulator on RPE-FRN
simple effect size was found (magnitude: .72 v, k  27;
likelihood: 1.60 v, k  24; F(1, 47)  2.92, p  .09). The
apparent strong effect of modulator shown by a comparison of the
subplots in Figure 3, and the means above, was due to the medi-
ating effect of control over outcome (see below). Because Figure
3 also suggested the possibility that the RPE-FRN of likelihood
experiments occupied a longer interval than that for magnitude
experiments, this was investigated using a mean amplitude mea-
sure in the interval 335 ms–500 ms. The effect of modulator on
RPE-FRN in this interval proved to be narrowly nonsignificant
(magnitude: .23 v, k  27; likelihood: 1.38 v, k  24; F(1,
47)  3.80, p  .057).
Control over outcome. A significant effect of control over
outcome was found, with RPE-FRN amplitude increasing as con-
trol grew (passive: .07 v, k  5; guessing: .88 v, k  34;
rule implementation: 2.47 v, k  12; F(2, 46)  9.71, p 
.001). Post hoc comparisons revealed all pairwise comparisons to
be significant (p  .05). A significant effect was also found in the
later interval of 335 ms–500 ms (passive: .41 v, k  5;
guessing: .25 v, k  34; rule implementation: 2.56 v, k 
12; F(2, 46)  7.40, p  .002). Post hoc comparisons in this
interval revealed that rule implementation produced a significantly
stronger RPE-FRN than passive or guess designs (p  .05), but
these two levels did not significantly differ. Waveforms of the
RPE-FRN for the three levels (with modulator collapsed out) are
shown in Figure 6.
Domain. No effect of domain on the RPE–FRN was found
(gain: 1.37 v, k  25; mixed: .82 v, k  26; F(1, 51) 
.01).
Magnitude cuing. No effect of magnitude cuing on the RPE-
FRN was found (cued: .70 v, k  20; uncued: .59 v, k  8;
F(1, 26)  .1).
Validation of the GGA Technique
Where an electrophysiological component is quantified in di-
verse ways in a literature, we have argued that the GGA technique
is superior to conventional meta-analysis because it allows quan-
tification to be made in a standardized interval. Nevertheless, the
GGA technique suffers two potential drawbacks relative to con-
ventional meta-analysis. The first is that the process of recovering
original data from published figures introduces measurement error.
The second is that the GGA technique has no access to information
on within-study variability and treats each study as equivalent in
this regard. In comparison, conventional meta-analysis uses
standardized effect sizes which incorporate a measure of this
variability, serving to down-weight effects found in studies with
high variability. The output of the GGA analyses was therefore
compared with the output from analyses performed on the
original data obtained directly from authors, allowing us to
assess the impact of these potential drawbacks.
Digitizing error. Digitizing error could be easily measured
by comparing the digitized data with the original data in the 27
studies of the validation dataset. The difference between the
two data sources could either be as a result of the process used
to digitize the figures, or discrepancies between the original
data and the figures used in publication. To quantify the digi-
tizing error, a second coder (naive to the hypothesis under test)
repeated the digitizing process of the original coder for the
whole of the validation dataset. This allowed us to assess the
degree of error within a single coder (intracoder error), between
the two coders (intercoder error), and between the main coder
and the original data (coder-original error). Average errors for
the RPE-FRN in the critical interval 228 ms–334 ms were as
follows. The main coder showed an intracoder error of .011
v (SD  .099), and the secondary coder .004 v (SD 
.028). Comparison of the two coders’ average scores revealed
an intercoder error of .005 v (SD  .075). Comparison of
the main coder with original data revealed a coder-original error
of .096 v (SD  .327). Intra- and intercoder error was very
low suggesting that an accurate digitizing of a published figure
is unproblematic. Error rates between the main coder and the
original data were higher than between the two coders, implying
Figure 3. Modulation of the FRN by (a) magnitude, and (b) likelihood.
Difference waves (FRNs) are created from negative RPE minus positive
RPE waveforms. The RPE-FRN simple effect size is the difference of the
two difference waves. See the online article for the color version of this
figure.
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that the main source of discrepancy lies with the preparation of
graphs for publication. Examination on a case by case basis
revealed that this was isolated to a few studies that would
appear to have used a low-pass filter on the figure, but not the
data, or a degree of erroneous vertical or horizontal translation
of the waveform of one of the experiment’s conditions. How-
ever, the amount of coder-original error is nevertheless very
modest compared with the average simple effect sizes found in
the GGA meta-analysis. Furthermore, it should be stressed that
these digitizing errors did not affect the statistical testing ap-
plied to GGAs earlier, because original data was used in their
stead. They merely give an estimate of the extent of the error in
the remaining 27 studies for which no original data was avail-
able, and for the use of the technique generally.
Figure 4. Forest plot showing RPE-FRN simple effect size in (a) magnitude and, (b) likelihood designs. Simple
effect size was measured by mean amplitude in the interval 228 ms–334 ms. The size of squares indicates the
sample size, which also constituted the weighting in the GGA meta-analysis. The diamond shows average
weighted simple effect size and 95% confidence intervals. No confidence intervals could be computed for
individual studies because of the GGA technique used.
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224 SAMBROOK AND GOSLIN
Meta-analysis of original data. To assess the overall perfor-
mance of the GGA technique, an “ideal” conventional meta-
analysis was conducted using the same interval as used for the
GGA meta-analysis, but with standardized effect sizes calculated
from the original data in the validation dataset. The results of this
meta-analysis were then compared with a GGA meta-analysis run
on the same subsample of 27 studies. Results of both meta-
analyses are given in Table 1. Quite aside from its role in validat-
ing the GGA technique it can be seen that the conventional
Figure 5. Funnel plots for the unweighted simple effect size of the
RPE-FRN under (a) magnitude, and (b) likelihood. Dotted lines represent
three standard deviations. See the online article for the color version of this
figure.
Figure 6. RPE-FRN at different levels of the “control over outcome”
moderator: (a) simple effect size, and (b) significance of simple effect size. Ta
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meta-analysis also strongly supports this study’s hypotheses,
showing a significant RPE-FRN effect size under both the mag-
nitude and likelihood modulators. With regard to validating the
GGA technique here and more generally, it can be seen that the
two meta-analytic methods give very close results in regard to
significance testing of the mean amplitude measure. The z statistic
from conventional meta-analysis and the t statistic from the GGA
technique are very similar under both magnitude (5.36 vs. 5.27)
and likelihood (6.55 vs. 6.19) modulators. For the peak measure,
the ideal conventional meta-analysis reveals the GGA technique to
have been conservative. This is to be expected, as the GGA
technique measures the peak amplitude of grand averages rather
than participant averages, and thus is subject to greater temporal
smearing due to individual differences in latency across partici-
pants. Note that while Table 1 reports both average standardized
effect size under ideal conventional meta-analysis and average
simple effect size under the GGA technique, these should not be
directly compared as they are denominated in different units. For
GGAs they are measured in microvolts, for the conventional
meta-analysis, in standard deviations of microvolts. Effect sizes
for individual studies see Table S1 in the online supplemental
materials. Note also that the validation dataset can be considered
representative insofar as there was no significant difference in the
RPE-FRN simple effect size of studies in or out of the validation
dataset, t(53)  1.54, p  .13.
Meta-analysis of published effect sizes. We also performed a
conventional meta-analysis of published effects. As previously
stated, we believe this is an unsound meta-analysis because it
draws on effect sizes measured in different intervals and from
quite different quantifications of the FRN (e.g., mean amplitude,
peak of difference wave, peak to peak of simple waves). Never-
theless it is interesting for comparative purposes and furthermore
permits a quantifying of the simpler “face value” of accumulated
reporting findings regarding likelihood and magnitude modulators.
The meta-analysis was performed on a reduced dataset because a
number of articles did not report statistics for the RPE-FRN effect
(see Appendix 1) The average standardized effect size for the
magnitude modulator (k 15) was nonsignificantly different from
zero (d  .26 [.80, .29], z  .914, p  .361). The average
standardized effect size for the likelihood modulator (k  18) was
however significant (d  .95 [1.34, .56], z  4.82, p 
.001). Standardized effect sizes for individual studies see Table S2
in the online supplemental materials.
Main Effects of Magnitude and Likelihood
Although the principal objective of the study was to test for the
existence of an RPE-FRN by examining the FRN’s sensitivity to
modulation by magnitude and likelihood, a consideration of these
modulators’ main effects is also valuable in interpreting the post-
feedback waveform that FRN studies are likely to generate. Com-
ponent overlap is an ever-present concern in ERP experiments and
we felt it was very possible that an RPE-FRN would be superim-
posed on other components responding to magnitude, likelihood,
or indeed valence, alone. Figure 7 represents all main effects in the
form of difference waves. The RPE-FRN, calculated from magni-
tude and likelihood studies combined, is added for the purposes of
comparison. Significance of main effects was determined using the
Maris and Oostenveld technique. This revealed a magnitude main
effect (Monte Carlo p  .0001), such that low magnitude out-
comes were associated with a relative negativity in an interval
running from 124 ms to the measurement boundary of 500 ms,
with the effect greatest at 322 ms (2.10 v). Also revealed was
a significant main effect of likelihood (Monte Carlo p  .0001),
such that high likelihood outcomes were associated with a relative
negativity in an interval running from 299 ms to the measurement
boundary of 500 ms (Monte Carlo p  .0001), with the effect
strongest at 426 ms (3.51 v). Finally there was a main effect of
valence (Monte Carlo p  .0001), that is, an FRN, in the interval
150 ms–401 ms, with the effect greatest at 276 ms (2.27 v).
Discussion
The RPE-FRN and Main Effects of Valence,
Magnitude, and Likelihood
Holroyd and Coles (2002) proposed that the FRN encoded an
RPE. The results are consistent with this claim. FRNs created from
large RPEs were of greater amplitude than those from small RPEs,
both when RPE size was modulated by magnitude, and by likeli-
hood. The demonstration that the FRN is responsive to variations
in magnitude is important because it is a key requirement of a
general RPE encoder, and evidence in previous experiments has
largely been against this. The present meta-analysis shows that
once quantification of the FRN is standardized, a clear magnitude
effect on the FRN can be seen.
A number of recent articles have reported evidence consistent
with the FRN constituting an unsigned prediction error or “sa-
lience” encoding (Hauser et al., 2014; Oliveira, McDonald, &
Goodman, 2007; Talmi, Atkinson, & El-Deredy, 2013; Talmi,
Fuentemilla, Litvak, Duzel, & Dolan, 2012). Such a component
should show a strong main effect of RPE size (i.e., of likelihood
and magnitude) but no main effect of valence, and no interaction
of RPE size and valence (i.e., no RPE-FRN), because unsigned
prediction errors should be insensitive to valence. The present
study refutes this claim. Nevertheless, salience is clearly coded in
the postfeedback waveforms, as shown by the strong main effects
of likelihood and magnitude in Figure 7, with these main effects
Figure 7. Main effects of magnitude, likelihood and valence (RPE-FRN
shown for comparison). See the online article for the color version of this
figure.
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226 SAMBROOK AND GOSLIN
approximately twice the size of the RPE-FRN to which each
modulator contributes. The later time course of these effects sug-
gests that they may well be P3 effects.
Regardless of their source, the fact that multiple components
contribute to activity at frontocentral electrodes touches on an
important conceptual point. This meta-analysis shows that fronto-
central activity in the interval in which the FRN is typically
measured is responsive to the main effects of magnitude, likeli-
hood, and valence, and also to the interaction of valence with both
magnitude and likelihood. It appears that multiple components
operate in this interval. However, the debate following the publi-
cation of Holroyd and Coles’ theory has crystallized around the
idea of a single component in this interval, whose character will
ultimately be resolved through careful experimentation. In prac-
tice, we suspect that the character of the component described by
a given experiment as the “FRN” will depend strongly on the
interval in which this component is measured. For example, in
Talmi, Fuentemilla, Litvak, Duzel, and Dolan (2012) and Hauser
et al.’s (2014) articles, evidence was presented favoring a salience
account, however measurement was made at the latency of max-
imal FRN amplitude, that is the maximal main effect of valence.
Although this was a pragmatic choice and based on precedent, this
latency was nevertheless not necessarily one best suited to dem-
onstrating an RPE-FRN if there was one to be found, since that is
shown by a Valence  RPE Size interaction, not a valence main
effect. In practice, this resulted in these papers measuring effects at
	220 ms. However, this was prior to the period where the RPE-
FRN was observed in this meta-analysis but where salience effects
were marked in magnitude and close to significance for likelihood.
In the FRN debate generally, we suspect that the sensitivity of the
FRN to the key factors that are used to infer its function has
depended on the latency of its measurement to a degree which has
not been fully appreciated.
It is possible that in the future, separation of these components
may be assisted by improved knowledge about their scalp distri-
butions. Because of the limited and variable electrode arrays
available, the present meta-analysis cannot offer guidance here.
Furthermore, the FRN itself is partly defined by being maximal
over frontocentral sites. Given that is a now well-established
definition, it is likely any published example of the FRN would
also have to demonstrate a frontocentral maximum, in order to be
accepted as such. Therefore, any meta-analysis of the FRN would
be very likely to reflect this established scalp distribution. In
contrast, it seems likely that the later strong likelihood effect, and
possibly magnitude effect shown in Figure 7 are P3 effects and
would be maximal at more parietal locations.
The RPE-FRN was stronger when participants were engaged in
a task over which they had reason to believe they enjoyed some
control. In the strongest case of control, where participants imple-
mented a known rule, the RPE-FRN also lasted much longer, as
can be seen in Figure 6. These results suggest the possibility that
the RPE-FRN might be selectively recruited by the apparatus of
instrumental conditioning, rather than acting as a general purpose
representation of value. Some caution must be exercised in regard
to this finding, first, because subjective involvement was probably
lower with reduced control (Yeung, Holroyd, & Cohen, 2005) and,
second, because 10 of the 12 studies used for the “rule implemen-
tation” level of this moderator came from experiments conducted
by just two authors.
The RPE-FRN in magnitude studies was unaffected by whether
the magnitude of the forthcoming outcome was cued in advance.
As such, it appears that the RPE-FRN does not scale RPEs to the
range of outcomes on a given trial. We do not believe this should
be regarded as evidence that RPEs are genuinely coded on an
absolute scale however, because this would be functionally ex-
tremely limited and is biologically implausible. Scaling, or “adap-
tation,” is a ubiquitous feature of sensory processes, allowing, for
example, the eye to discriminate luminance over nine orders of
magnitude despite only three orders of contrast being available at
a given moment. We would expect such a solution to be used for
evaluating RPEs, which likewise have a very broad range As such,
this moderator analysis suggests that outcomes are not scaled to
the range of magnitudes available on a trial, but the wider context
of the experiment. Nevertheless, this is an interesting result, be-
cause it suggests that the expected value term against which RPEs
are calculated may not simply be inherited from the midbrain
dopamine system, or at least those midbrain dopaminergic neurons
that have shown strong scaling effects (Tobler et al., 2005), and is
thus relevant to the ongoing question of the afferents of the FRN.
Applications of the Present Findings
The FRN is a robustly elicited component, easy to study in
human participants, and appears to encode an RPE. It may thus
contribute to the daunting task of uncovering the network of neural
events that give rise to subjective valuation by humans. Holroyd
and Coles’ theory of the FRN was focused on its role in reinforce-
ment learning, rather than its role as a general index of subjective
value. However, the relationship between reinforcement learning
and valuation is close. The information concerning action-reward
contingencies that is held in a reinforcement learning system
presumably strongly informs the valuation of the actions available
to people in a given situation. Thus, if it can be measured (e.g., by
the FRN) it is has predictive power for human choice of the kind
that neuroeconomics strives to attain.
The nature of the reinforcement learning system underlying the
FRN is therefore pertinent. Reinforcement learning falls into two
broad classes, model-free and model-based. Model-free reinforce-
ment learning assigns values to actions based on the net reward
they can expect to incur, without consideration of the actual
outcomes that are produced. The values are updated in light of
RPEs, but are termed “habit values” because they encode only the
historical value of an action. Such learning is computationally
efficient and information poor because the structure of rewards and
the probabilities that follow an action is cached into a single value.
Model-based reinforcement learning uses a model of the environ-
ment which represents actions, rewards, and intermediate states,
and calculates values of actions by a tree search of this model.
Although more computationally expensive, this can be more
quickly updated. A recent review of model-free and model-based
reinforcement learning is provided by Walsh and Anderson (2014).
The relevance of this distinction to human choice is that model-
based reinforcement learning is likely to be continuous with gen-
eral cognition (Chater, 2009). Thus the degree to which choice on
any one occasion is influenced by wider knowledge, by delibera-
tive reasoning, or by verbal instruction will depend on the degree
to which a model-free habitual system or a model-based belief
system is dominant at that time. If the FRN can be established as
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belonging to one system or the other, it can be used as a much
more direct means to investigate the relative contributions of
habitual and belief based valuation to behavior, and assist in
accounting for variations in both inter- and intraindividual choice
that elude the revealed preferences method.
Although the present demonstration that the FRN encodes an
RPE places the debate on a much firmer footing, there has never-
theless been limited work on this important question. Hajcak,
Moser, Holroyd, and Simons (2007) and Moser and Simons (2009)
both showed a relationship of FRN amplitude to RPEs generated
against subjective predictions but not to reinforcement history,
implying the component might arise from model-based reinforce-
ment learning, whereas Ichikawa, Siegle, Dombrovski, and Ohira
(2010) found comparable contributions of subjective prediction
and reinforcement history to FRN amplitude. However, Walsh and
Anderson (2011b) found persuasive evidence against model-based
reinforcement learning. They compared the FRN in cases where
participants received verbal instruction on choice-outcome contin-
gencies to cases where they did not. In the instruction condition,
participants used this instruction, as shown by their behavior, thus
adopting the given “model.” However, when unexpected out-
comes, that is model-based RPEs, occurred, the FRN was initially
insensitive to these. Its sensitivity developed only at the rate shown
in the no-instruction condition suggesting it was dependent on a
model-free history of reinforcement. A number of other authors
have been able to show that FRN amplitude corresponds to the size
of RPEs derived from a model-free reinforcement learning algo-
rithm (Chase, Swainson, Durham, Benham, & Cools, 2011; Cohen
& Ranganath, 2007; Philiastides, Biele, Vavatzanidis, Kazzer, &
Heekeren, 2010). Other evidence for a model-free basis for the
FRN comes from the demonstration that dopamine, the neurotrans-
mitter implicated in generating the FRN, promotes model-free
rather than model-based reinforcement learning (Wunderlich,
Smittenaar, & Dolan, 2012). On current balance the evidence
favors the FRN’s role in model-free reinforcement learning.
Insofar as model-free reinforcement learning is computationally
cheap, it might be expected to occur by default, and indeed, to
continue to compute valuations and associated RPEs even when a
superior model-based reinforcement learning system was guiding
behavior. Bayer and Glimcher (2005), for example, showed that
midbrain dopaminergic neurons, which are believed to underlie the
FRN, showed firing patterns consistent with a model-free RPE and
continued to behave in this fashion even when their effect on
behavior was weak. In the case of the FRN itself, the component
has in some cases been shown to predict choice in a way that is
consistent with reinforcement learning (Cohen & Ranganath,
2007; Van der Helden, Boksem, & Blom, 2010; Yasuda, Sato,
Miyawaki, Kumano, & Kuboki, 2004), but in other cases it has not
(Mars, De Bruijn, Hulstijn, Miltner, & Coles, 2004; Mas-Herrero
& Marco-Pallarés, 2014; San Martín, Appelbaum, Pearson, Huet-
tel, & Woldorff, 2013; Yeung & Sanfey, 2004). In particular,
Chase, Swainson, Durham, Benham, and Cools (2011) showed
that in a reversal learning task, the nature of which would be
expected to engage model-based reinforcement learning, an FRN
was observed that was well described by model-free reinforcement
learning but which nevertheless did not predict behavior, suggest-
ing it was overridden by a model-based system. Findings such as
these suggest that the FRN might be used to predict behavior in
situations promoting relatively automatic, fast judgments, what has
been described by dual process theories as System 1 (Kahneman,
2003). Such valuation has been underrepresented by the traditional
methods of behavioral economics, which rely on stated (rather than
observed) preferences in one-shot (rather than repeated) choices,
which place prominence on deliberative processing. However,
perhaps the most serious challenge that the studies cited above
pose for behavioral and neoclassical economics lies in the possi-
bility that rather than value being constructed from multiple terms,
as is suggested for example by prospect theory, quite separate
independent valuations might be constructed which have differen-
tial access to behavior depending on circumstances.
Even while the precise nature of the valuation associated with
the FRN remains unresolved, it may nevertheless serve as a bio-
marker for subjective value. It has been proposed in this regard for
a range of psychopathologies such as hypomania and depression
(Bress, Smith, Foti, Klein, & Hajcak, 2012; Mason, O’Sullivan,
Bentall, & El-Deredy, 2012) 2012) and pathological gambling
(Hewig et al., 2010). Furthermore, a number of recent studies have
shown that variation in dopaminergic genes affects the component
(e.g., Foti & Hajcak, 2012; Marco-Pallarés et al., 2009) raising the
possibility that it might be used to investigate the proximate basis
of genetic effects on behavior. With the advent of mobile electro-
encephalography (EEG) setups that can be ready to use within
minutes, the FRN may also provide a useful general measure of the
subjective value of an outcome even in studies in which the brain
is not the principal focus, much as other psychophysiological
techniques such as skin conductance and pupillometry are used
more broadly. As a dependent variable of subjective value it has a
number of advantages over self-report. Asking subjects to report
on their valuations brings in extra processes which generally
undermines the ecological validity of the study of “online” eval-
uation. Reported valuations may be subject to demand character-
istics because participants are likely to be aware of at least some
norms in economic preference, such as avoiding obvious incon-
sistencies and intransitivities. Self-report may also be affected by
what reference point the stated valuation is taken with respect to,
which depends in turn on the framing of the question used to
prompt self-report.
Alternative Accounts of the FRN
A number of tasks elicit a frontocentral negativity, or N2, at the
latency of the FRN (see Folstein & Van Petten, 2008, for a review),
and as such, alternative accounts of the FRN exist. One of these is that
it is merely an oddball, detecting the unexpectedness of events. This
is rather close to the claim that it simply codes salience which has
been disconfirmed in this meta-analysis. Attempts to experimentally
dissociate the FRN and N2 oddball have met with some success
(Holroyd, Pakzad-Vaezi, & Krigolson, 2008; Warren & Holroyd,
2012).
The N2 is believed to indicate activity in the anterior cingulate
cortex (Nieuwenhuis, Yeung, Van Den Wildenberg, & Ridderinkhof,
2003; Yeung, Botvinick, & Cohen, 2004). Botvinick, Braver, Barch,
Carter, and Cohen (2001) have claimed that the ACC is responsible
for cognitive control, becoming active when response conflict occurs,
and Brown and Braver (2005) have made the related claim that the
anterior cingulate cortex detects the likelihood of errors. Indeed,
circumstances in which cognitive control and error likelihood are high
do increase N2 amplitude, for example on no-go trials in a go/no-go
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task (Folstein & Van Petten, 2008). The theories can account for the
FRN’s response to reward if nonreward is regarded as an error, thus
signaling the need for increased cognitive control. Furthermore, a
different component, the error related negativity shares a common
scalp distribution with the FRN, and is strongly implicated in these
functions, inasmuch as it indicates internal registration of an error. In
fact, Holroyd and Coles’ theory also specifies a functional relationship
between these two components, arguing that they both reflect RPEs
arising from a sudden revision of reward expectation, either by ex-
ternal feedback in the case of the FRN or internal monitoring in the
case of the error related negativity.
A further alternative account of the FRN is that it is an affective
rather than economic response to outcomes (Gehring & Wil-
loughby, 2002; Luu, Tucker, Derryberry, Reed, & Poulsen,
2003).This is rather difficult to disentangle from the RPE account
because of the affective nature of reward. However, those studies
that have compared affective ratings of outcomes with the FRN
amplitudes associated with them have tended to find a poor rela-
tionship (Li, Han, Lei, Holroyd, & Li, 2011; Sambrook et al.,
2012; Yang, Gu, Tang, & Luo, 2013).
Implications for the Measurement of the RPE-FRN
and FRN
We have distinguished between a response simply to valence,
the FRN, well established in the literature, and a neural response to
the valence and size of an RPE, the RPE-FRN, for which we have
presented evidence here. The distinction is important for the test-
ing of Holroyd and Coles’ theory. However, it is not widely made
in the literature and the comments below apply equally to both
FRN and RPE-FRN.
The present meta-analysis revealed a wide variation in methods
used to quantify the FRN, and we have noted the role this may play
both in failures of replication and inflation of false positives. We
have also noted the variability of the waveforms themselves. These
two aspects are linked insofar as inconsistencies in FRN quantifica-
tion possibly reflect the genuine attempt to best tailor analysis to a
component of seemingly inconsistent character on an experiment-
by-experiment basis. However, if, as we have argued, variability in
the waveforms largely reflects the vagaries of component overlap
rather than real variability in the FRN, then this latitude in quan-
tification is harmful. For example, in the present meta-analysis, P2
and N2 peaks varied so much in their latency across experiments
that while we initially intended to apply the GGA technique to a
peak to peak measure, implemented in standardized intervals, we
were unable to do so. This illustrates the point that while peaks
might provide compelling landmarks by which to detect the FRN
in any individual study, the lack of consistency across studies
suggests the benefits of locking FRN quantification to simple
waveform peaks may be illusory. The loose relationship between
single waveform peaks and the underlying components has been
cogently described by Luck (2005).
As such, measures based on difference waves are to be preferred.
For the specific case of the RPE-FRN, a measurement interval of 270
ms–300 ms is suggested by the present study since this captures the
strongest effects of both magnitude and likelihood and is thus the best
estimate of the RPE-FRN’s latency. However, the RPE-FRN in
individual experiments may be subject to genuine latency differences
and so, based on the course of the effect under both modulators, the
interval 240 ms–340 ms may be more appropriate. It should be noted
that studies which more effectively decompose waveforms into con-
stituent components, for example using principal components analy-
sis, may reveal a rather different latency for the underlying RPE
encoder, or encoders. Indeed Figure 7 suggests that such decomposi-
tion may well be necessary to fully isolate the individual components.
Evaluation of the GGA Technique
The GGA technique was developed because the great variety in
how the FRN was quantified rendered conventional meta-analysis
highly problematic. It is worthwhile assessing how this technique
performed, partly in judging the present findings, but also for its future
use in ERP meta-analysis. First, our concerns regarding the conven-
tional meta-analysis of the FRN using effect sizes derived from
diverse quantifications proved justified. When such a meta-analysis
was performed it failed to find a significant effect of magnitude on the
FRN, despite this effect being strongly present in an ideal conven-
tional meta-analysis on original data. In contrast, the GGA technique
was in close agreement. The conclusion we draw from the superior
performance of the GGAs is that it is more important to employ an
appropriate and consistent quantification of a component than to have
access to the measures of within-study variance that use of published
statistics provides. Of course the ideal meta-analysis achieved both of
these objectives. However, the GGA technique only requires access to
published data. This has a great number of advantages. Most impor-
tantly, it avoids the large reduction in sample size that reliance on
original authors inevitably entails. It substantially reduces the effort
required to acquire data and convert it to a common format, and
makes no demands at all on the original authors. It removes the
uncertainty surrounding the number of studies that the meta-analysis
will contain, allowing the viability of the exercise to be assessed in
advance. It avoids the danger of bias arising from authors selectively
complying with the request for original data depending on what they
perceive the meta-analyzer’s hypothesis to be. Finally, the technique
can be used to guide the development of future work. If an effect,
component, or other subset of the ERP in a published study was not
selected for analysis within that study, there will not be any effect
sizes on which to base a traditional meta-analysis. The GGA tech-
nique allows for post hoc exploration of published ERPs, allowing the
researcher to approximate the effect sizes of previously disregarded
data to guide the design of new empirical study, theory, or analysis
technique. It is for this reason that we have made available the grand
averages used in this meta-analysis as supplementary files.
The GGA technique has some disadvantages. Simple, rather than
standardized effect sizes were used, meaning that the GGA meta-
analysis could not down-weight studies with large variance, thus
introducing some noise into hypothesis testing. The extent of this can
be simply estimated from the validation dataset by calculating the
correlation coefficient of the simple effect sizes of the GGA technique
and the standardized effect sizes of the ideal conventional meta-
analysis: the lower the correlation, the greater the noise introduced by
failure to use standardized effect size. The value was r .8, suggest-
ing a moderate degree of noise introduced. This is, however, an
overestimate of the problem insofar as standardized effect sizes them-
selves are not perfect because the standard deviations they are built
from are themselves subject to sampling error. The remaining source
of noise in the GGA technique consists in deviations between the
digitized waveforms used for the meta-analysis and the original data;
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however, comparisons with the validation dataset set suggest this is
relatively small.
It should be noted that differences between experiments regarding
the reference electrode, filters, and baseline do not impact on the GGA
technique because all contrasts and simple effect sizes are generated
within-experiment, and so these extraneous factors can never become
confounds for the simple generic reason that they are held constant at
the point of generating simple effect sizes. It is true that FRN ampli-
tude itself may be affected by these parameters, and that a poorly
chosen reference electrode, for example, might reduce FRN ampli-
tudes overall, concomitantly reduce effect sizes, and assist in render-
ing a meta-analysis nonsignificant. However, in this regard GGAs do
not differ from conventional meta-analysis. We simply note that
because reference electrode is held constant within each study it does
not confound the simple effect size generated for that individual study,
and because this meta-analysis is simply a collation of such simple
effect sizes it likewise cannot be confounded by reference electrode.
We propose the GGA technique as a general method for meta-
analysis of ERP components, not just the FRN. While inconsistency
of measurement has been shown to be a particular problem for the
FRN, this is also likely to be true to some degree of other components.
Furthermore, even when conventional meta-analysis is applied, we
still propose that this be performed in concert with a GGA analysis, to
check there is no gross difference in results. As an accompanying
method it also has the advantage that it allows the plotting of a
waveform to accompany the reported effects. Individual ERP exper-
iments ubiquitously plot an entire waveform despite their reported
effects occurring in a small portion of the waveform because it
provides a “sanity check” that the ERP shows a representative char-
acter and that the interval chosen for analysis is reasonable. A GGA
waveform serves the same function in the case of a meta-analysis.
Conclusion
Neuroeconomics attempts to explain valuation by the brain. The
present study addressed this question at the relatively large scale of
EEG. It found that an easily elicited electrophysiological component,
the FRN, behaved in manner consistent with it representing valuation
of an outcome. Because of the temporal precision of EEG and the
inherent benefits of convergent evidence from different methodolo-
gies, it is to be hoped that further study of the FRN will assist in
uncovering the full picture of how the brain represents subjective
value.
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Appendix
Experiments Used in the Meta-Analysis, Including Whether an Effect Consistent With an RPE-FRN Was Found,
FRN Quantification, the Waveform Used if Additional Ones Were Present in the Listed Figure (WAV), the
Domain of the Gamble (DOM), and Whether Magnitude of an Outcome Was Cued (CUE)
Experiment N RPE-FRNa Site FRNb WAV FIG DOM CUEc
Likelihood modulator
Bellebaum & Daum (2008) 17 Yes Pool Mean amp 220–280 Postlearning 4 Gain
Bellebaum et al. (2010a) 15 No Pool Peak to peak: P2 (150–N2) to N2
(200–340)
Postlearning 4b Gain
Bellebaum et al. (2011) 18 Yes Cz Peak of diff wave 100–300 Younger participants 3a Gain
Franken et al. (2010) 47 — Fz Mean amp 200–300 2 Gain
Hajcak et al. (2005)
Experiment 1 17 No Fz Peak of diff wave 200–500 1 Gain
Hajcak et al. (2005)
Experiment 2 12 No Fz Peak of diff wave 200–500 3 Gain
Hajihosseini et al. (2012) 20 Fz Mean amp 100 either side of N2 peak 2a Mixed
Holroyd et al. (2003) 10 Yes FCz Peak to peak: P2 (160–240) to N2
(P2–325)
2c Gain
Holroyd et al. (2008) 12 — FCz Peak to peak: P2 (160–240) to N2
(P2–325)
Time-estimation 1b Gain
Holroyd et al. (2009)
Experiment 1 20 Yes FCz Peak of diff wave 0–600 2 Gain
Holroyd et al. (2009)
Experiment 2 15 Yes FCz Peak of diff wave 0–600 2 Gain
Holroyd et al. (2009)
Experiment 3 15 Yes FCz Peak of diff wave 0–600 2 Gain
Holroyd et al. (2011) 18 Yes FCz Peak of diff wave 200–300 Outcome locked 1a Gain
Larson et al. (2007) 11 — FCz Peak to peak: P2 (125–325) to N2
(P2–325)
Control 2 Gain
Liao et al. (2011) 19 Yes Fz Peak of diff wave 150–500 Outcome locked 4 Gain
Morris et al. (2011) 23 No Cz Peak of diff wave 	180–300 Passive gambling
task
1 Gain
Pfabigan et al. (2012) 20 No FCz Peak to peak: P2 (preceding positive
peak) to N2 (200–350)
Second half 1 Mixed
Sambrook & Goslin
(unpublished)
Experiment 3 42 FCz Unpublished Gain/Loss
Talmi et al. (2013) 20 No (p  .06) Pool Amplitudes at sample points 205–250 Reward condition 4d Gain
Walsh & Anderson (2011a) 13 Yes FCz Mean amp of diff wave 200–300 4 Gain
Walsh & Anderson (2011b) 20 Yes FCz Mean amp of diff wave 200–350 No instruction
condition
3 Gain
Walsh & Anderson (2013)
Experiment 1 14 Yes FCz Mean amp of diff wave 240–400 Standard and novel 6 Gain
Walsh & Anderson (2013)
Experiment 2 14 Yes FCz Mean amp of diff wave 240–400 Standard and novel 6 Gain
Walsh & Anderson,
(unpublished)
Experiment 1 13 FCz Unpublished Gain
Walsh & Anderson
(unpublished)
Experiment 2 13 FCz Unpublished Gain
Yu et al. (2011) 16 — Fz Mean amp 275–325 and peak to peak
(details not given)
Outcome locked
25%/75%
2b,c Mixed
Magnitude modulator
Banis & Lorist (2012) 32 Wrong way FCz Mean amp 230–300/Mean amp 230–
300 relative to average of mean
amps of P2 (180–225) and P3
(320–390)/Peak to peak P2 (150–
230) to N2 (P2–330)
Average of noise 2 Mixed N
Bellebaum et al. (2010b) 20 Yes Fz Peak to peak: P2 (preceding positivity
from 150) to N2 (200–350)
Blocks 3–6, 5c vs.
50c
3b Gain Y
(Appendix continues)
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Appendix (continued)
Experiment N RPE-FRNa Site FRNb WAV FIG DOM CUEc
Gu et al. (2011) 24 Yes Fz Peak to average peak: P2 (preceding
positive peak) to N2 (200–400) to
P3 (succeeding positive peak)
Outcome valence
subsequently
4b Mixed Y
Hajcak et al. (2006)
Experiment 1
16 No Fz Peak to peak: P2 (150–350) to N2
(P2–350)
1 Mixed N
Hajcak et al. (2006)
Experiment 2
17 No Fz Peak to peak: P2 (150–350) to
(P2–350)
3 Mixed N
Hajihosseini et al. (2012) 20 No Fz Mean amp 100 either side of N2 peak 2c Mixed Y
Kamarajan et al. (2009) 48 Wrong way FCz N2 peak 200–275 Sexes averaged 4 Mixed Y
Luo & Qu (2013) 18 Yes FCz Mean amp 200–250 Win/loss at ¥1
vs. ¥40
3a,b Mixed Y
Mushtaq et al.
(unpublished) 29 FCz Unpublished Mixed Y
Nittono et al. (2008) 16 — Fz Peak to peak: P2 (preceding positive
peak) to N2 (150–300)
Even cond., 10/
1/
1/
10
1a Mixed N
Onoda et al. (2010) 17 — FCz Peak of diff wave 250–400 1 Mixed Y
Pedroni et al. (2011) 16 — Cz TANCOVA over entire waveform From author Gain Y
Roberts et al. (unpublished) 26 Fz Unpublished Mixed N
Sambrook & Goslin (2014) 55 Yes Pool Correlation of voltage and utility over
entire waveform
Gain/Loss N
Sambrook & Goslin
(unpublished)
Experiment 1 48 FCz Unpublished Gain Both
Sambrook & Goslin
(unpublished)
Experiment 2 45 FCz Unpublished Gain/Loss N
San Martin et al. (2010) 22 — FCz Mean amp 240–310 4 Mixed Y
Santesso et al. (2011) 30 Wrong Way FCz N2 Peak (200–400) Adult participants 2 Mixed Y
Sato et al. (2005) 18 No Fz Peak to peak: P2 (150–220) to N2
(P2–325)
1 Mixed Y
Schuermann et al. (2012) 20 Yes FCz Peak to peak: P2 (100–300) to N2
(200–400)
2 Mixed Y
Talmi et al. (2013) 20 — Pool Amps at sample points 205–250 Reward 4d Gain Y
Toyomaki & Murohashi
(2005)
13 — Fz Peak to peak: P2 (unspecified) to N2
(unspecified)
500/10/
10/

500
2 Mixed Y
Van den Berg et al. (2011) 42 — Fz Peak to peak: P2 (150–350) to N2
(following negative peak)
2 Mixed N
Wu & Zhou (2009) 16 No FCz Mean amp 250–350 Expected magnitudes 1 Mixed Y
Yeung & Sanfey (2004) 16 — FCz Peak to average Peak: P2 (preceding
positive peak) to N2 (200–400) to
P3 (succeeding positive peak)
2 Mixed Y
Yi et al. (2012) 28 No Fz Peak of N2 (200–400) 4b Mixed Y
Yu & Zhou (2006) 20 No Fz Mean amp 25 before and after peak
of diff wave
Execution 1 Mixed Y
Yu & Zhou (2009) 14 No Fz Mean amplitude 200–300 “To bet” trials 3 Mixed Y
Zottoli & Grose-Fifer
(2012)
18 Yes FCz Peak to peak: P2 (150–300) to N2
(200–425)
Adult participants 2a Mixed Y
a A dash indicates that the RPE-FRN was not reported. b Values in parentheses indicate the interval in which peak assignment was made in
milliseconds. c In cued studies participants know the magnitude of the forthcoming feedback but not its valence, in uncued studies participants knew
neither its magnitude nor its valence. d Eight waveforms corresponding to the Valence  Magnitude  Likelihood design were given; these were all
digitized and the unwanted factor collapsed out by averaging pairs of waveforms.
Received January 17, 2014
Revision received October 5, 2014
Accepted October 7, 2014 
Th
is
do
cu
m
en
ti
s
co
py
rig
ht
ed
by
th
e
A
m
er
ic
an
Ps
yc
ho
lo
gi
ca
lA
ss
oc
ia
tio
n
o
r
o
n
e
o
fi
ts
al
lie
d
pu
bl
ish
er
s.
Th
is
ar
tic
le
is
in
te
nd
ed
so
le
ly
fo
rt
he
pe
rs
on
al
u
se
o
ft
he
in
di
vi
du
al
u
se
r
an
d
is
n
o
t
to
be
di
ss
em
in
at
ed
br
oa
dl
y.
235FRN GREAT GRAND AVERAGES
